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When asked to offer “perceptions of the future” on bank merger 
antitrust enforcement, I recalled a statement attributed to physicist Niels 
Bohr: “Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.”1  And so 
it is for the future of antitrust.  Nevertheless, my perception is that bank 
merger antitrust will change very little in that the geographic scope of 
the relevant market for important banking services is, and will remain, 
local.2  Before peering into the future, however, it is useful to lay a 
foundation by considering past and present bank merger enforcement. 
The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) reviews roughly 600 bank 
mergers per year,3 of which it “challenges” roughly one, although these 
“challenges” do not entail the filing of complaints in district court.  In 
fact, the DOJ has not filed a complaint against a bank merger since 
1993.4  Rather, approximately once per year the DOJ issues a press 
release announcing that competitive concerns with a bank merger have 
been resolved though the divestiture of branches along with associated 
deposits and outstanding loans.5
 1. The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/26159.html (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 2. My perception is not based so much on expertise in the banking industry as on 
expertise in the delineation of relevant markets in merger cases. See, e.g., Gregory J. 
Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: Tailored Application of the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Test, 4 COMPETITION L.J. 69 (2005); Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in 
Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 363, 387–96 (1998); Gregory J. Werden, Market 
Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, 38 
ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (1993) [hereinafter Werden, Tenth Anniversary Retrospective]; 
Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department’s Merger 
Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514; Gregory J. Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipments 
Data in Defining Geographic Markets, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 719, 721 (1981). 
 3. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Workload Statistics Fiscal Year 1998-
2007, at 3, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). 
 4. The last two complaints filed in district court were those in United States v. 
Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,326 (N.D. Tex. 1993) 
(challenging the acquisition of New First City Bank-Midland N.A.) and United States v. 
Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,363 (N.D. Tex. 
1993) (challenging the acquisition of New First City Bank-Beaumont N.A.). 
 5. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches 
Agreement Requiring Divestitures In Merger Of First Busey Corporation And Main 
Street Trust Inc. (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_rel 
eases/2007/223869.htm (merger of First Busey Corp. and Main Street Trust Inc.); Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Agreement Requiring 
Divestitures In Merger Of Regions Financial Corp. and Amsouth Bancorporation (Oct. 
19, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/219180.pdf 
(merger of Regions Financial Corp. and AmSouth Bancorporation); Press Release, 
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In reviewing bank mergers, the DOJ and the bank regulatory 
agencies employ a well-publicized screening process.6  The process 
focuses primarily on shares of deposits within geographic areas 
delineated by the regional Federal Reserve banks.7  The 1202 rural 
regions delineated by the Federal Reserve banks are quite narrow; 573 
of them consist of a single county.8  Conversely, the 424 urban areas 
delineated by the Federal Reserve banks are much broader.9  Indeed, 
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Agreement With Wachovia Requiring 
Divestitures In Wachovia/Southtrust Merger (Aug. 25, 2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2004/205184.pdf (merger of Wachovia 
Corp. and SouthTrust Corp.); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Reaches Agreement With BB&T Requiring Divestitures In BB&T/First Virginia 
Merger (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/200 
3/201009.pdf (merger of BB&T Corp. and First Virginia Banks, Inc.). 
 6. See Bank Merger Competitive Review—Introduction and Overview (1995), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/6472.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).  For 
useful overviews on the statutes governing bank mergers and the procedures applied in 
reviewing them, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW: BANK 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS HANDBOOK 5–12, 60–63 (2006) [hereinafter ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW]; David S. Neill, Geographic Market Definition in the 
Antitrust Analysis of Bank Mergers, 123 BANKING L.J. 291 (2006); and Tim McCarthy, 
Refining Product Market Definition in the Antitrust Analysis of Bank Mergers, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 865, 884–98 (1997). 
 7. To find the relevant geographic market for any bank branch, one may utilize a 
tool provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. See CASSIDI, 
http://cassidi.stlouisfed.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). 
 8. Elizabeth S. Laderman & Steven J. Pilloff, Using County-Based Markets to 
Support and Federal Reserve Markets to Implement Bank Merger Policy, 3 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 127, 136 (2007). 
 9. Id.  Only 9.9% of the urban areas are single counties, whereas 47.7% of the 
rural areas are single counties.  Id.  The markets for major metropolitan areas often 
contain many counties.  The market for Houston consists of 10 counties.  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, Banking Market Definitions, http://dallasfed.org/banking/apps/ 
mkdef.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).  The market for Atlanta consists of 17 counties 
and parts of others.  Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Banking Market Definitions, 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/bank_info/bankmarkdef/bmd_index.cfm (follow “Georgia” 
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).  The market for New York City consists of 30 
counties and parts of others.  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Banking Markets, 
http://www.ny.frb.org/banking/ma_bankingmarkets.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).  
In addition, the market for Boston contains over 200 cities and towns.  Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, Banking Market Definition, http://www.bos.frb.org/bankinfo/struct/ind 
ex.htm#mardefs (follow “Massachusetts” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). 
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they are markedly broader than the relevant markets found in the 
Supreme Court’s bank merger decisions of the 1960s and 1970s.10
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank11 was the seminal 
Supreme Court case on the application of antitrust law to bank mergers, 
and one of the seminal Supreme Court cases on the application of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act12 to mergers in general.13  In that decision, 
the Court observed that “[t]he factor of inconvenience localizes banking 
competition as effectively as high transportation costs in other 
industries.”14  The Court also explained that different bank customers do 
their banking within areas of varying geographic scope, but the Court 
grouped all of them together and found that a four-county area 
surrounding Philadelphia represented a “workable compromise” as to 
the geographic area in which banks competed.15  The Court defended 
this area on the basis that the same area had been delineated as the 
relevant market by the bank regulatory agencies.16  Today, however, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia delineates a far-broader ten-
county market for that city.17
In United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank,18 the Court found 
the relevant geographic market included only the Phillipsburg-Easton 
area in western New Jersey, specifically rejecting the district court’s 
 10. See infra notes 11–18 and accompanying text (comparing two key Supreme 
Court decisions). 
 11. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 13. Most significantly, Philadelphia National Bank established a presumption of 
illegality for a merger that “produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of 
the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in 
the market.”  Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.  This presumption emerged just one 
term after the Court held that “the proper definition of the market is a ‘necessary 
predicate’ to an examination of the competition that may be affected by the horizontal 
aspects of the merger.”  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, 335 
(1962).  The Court also set out “practical indicia” for delineating the relevant market.  
See Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 
123, 154–58, 172–79 (1992). 
 14. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 358. 
 15. Id. at 360–61. 
 16. Id. at 361. 
 17. See Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Banking Markets, http://www.phila 
delphiafed.org/files/bm/mktframe.htm (following hyperlink to Philadelphia/South Jerse 
y) (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). 
 18. 399 U.S. 350 (1970). 
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inclusion of the adjoining part of Pennsylvania.19  Today, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York includes the adjoining part of Pennsylvania 
and Phillipsburg-Easton within its huge New York City metro area 
market, which consists of thirty entire counties and parts of others.20
Phillipsburg National Bank is of interest, however, mainly because 
it expanded on the Court’s rationale for delineating local markets by 
explaining what the Court termed “[c]ommercial realities.”21  The Court 
explained that the banks at issue “generally compete for deposits within 
a radius of only a few miles” and that convenience is especially 
important for “small customers.”22  Most importantly, the Court 
observed that the merging banks’ loans were mostly quite small, and 
declared that the “small borrower . . . must often depend upon his 
community reputation and upon his relationship with the local 
banker.”23  The Court’s rationale for the narrow geographic scope of the 
relevant market is significant because small business loans have been a 
major focus of concern in the DOJ’s bank merger investigations over the 
past two decades.24  The Court’s rationale foreshadows economic 
literature that formalized and tested this rationale when it appeared 
decades later.25
Before proceeding further on the geographic scope of relevant 
banking markets, it is necessary to consider briefly the product scope of 
these markets.  The Supreme Court decisions mentioned above held that 
the relevant product was the entire cluster of services provided by 
commercial banks.26  In contrast, since at least the early 1980s, the DOJ 
has delineated relevant product markets consisting of narrower ranges of 
services.27  In many of its merger investigations, the DOJ found that the 
 19. Id. at 362–65. 
 20. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Banking Markets, http://www.ny.frb.org/ 
banking/ma_bankingmarkets.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). 
 21. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank, 399 U.S. at 362. 
 22. Id. at 363. 
 23. Id. at 364. 
 24. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 36; Robert 
Kramer, Address before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association (Apr. 
14, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/214845.pdf; 
Constance K. Robinson, Address before the 31st Annual Banking Law Institute (May 
30, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1003.pdf. 
 25. See infra notes 43–74 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank, 399 U.S. at 359–61; United States v. Phila. Nat’l 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). 
 27. The DOJ alleged that “retail banking” and “wholesale banking” were two 
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relevant product market in which the merger’s effects on competition 
would be most significant was loans to small businesses or loans to 
small and medium-sized business.28
The narrower markets delineated by the DOJ resulted from the 
application of its 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Merger 
Guidelines”),29 which set out the basic methodology still used today for 
delineating relevant markets.  The Merger Guidelines articulated a 
hypothetical monopolist paradigm for market delineation, which 
gradually was adopted by courts in the United States and by 
enforcement agencies around the world.30  As set out in the Merger 
distinct relevant markets in United States v. Virginia National Bankshares, Inc., 1982-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982).  The DOJ alleged that “consumer 
banking” and “business banking” were two distinct relevant markets in United States v. 
National Bank & Trust Co. of Norwich, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 66,074 (N.D.N.Y. 
1984).  See also Eugene M. Katz, Determination of Line of Commerce for Bank 
Mergers: A Contemporary View, 5 J.L. & COM. 155, 169–71 (1985). 
 28. United States v. Central State Bank is the first case in which the DOJ alleged a 
relevant market for small business loans, and it remains the last bank merger case in 
which the DOJ has litigated to judgment. 621 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Mich. 1985), aff’d, 817 
F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987).  In that case, the district court found, “as a matter of law, the 
relevant market [was] the cluster of services and products that comprise the full range 
of services offered by commercial banks.” Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. at 1291–
92.  Despite the fact that the district court explicitly stated that the relevant market was 
“a matter of law,” the court of appeals held that the “trial court anchored its decision 
upon the facts developed during the course of the trial” and that its cluster market 
finding was not “clear error.” Central State Bank, 817 F.2d at 24.  McCarthy 
erroneously stated that the first case in which the DOJ alleged a relevant market for 
small business loans was United States v. First Hawaiian, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 69,457 (D. Haw. 1991). McCarthy, supra note 6 at 882-83; see also ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 225–57 (providing a reproduction of a 
report prepared by the DOJ on the competitive effects of that merger). 
 29. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in 4 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ¶ 13,102 [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].  The Merger 
Guidelines were significantly revised in 1984 and 1992 and slightly revised in 1997. 
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in 4 TRADE 
REG. REP. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 (for the current version); see also ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 57–72; Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Janusz A. 
Ordover, The 1992 Agency Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Department of 
Justice’s Approach to Bank Merger Analysis, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (1992) 
(providing comprehensive overviews of bank mergers). 
 30. See Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2003).  Coincidentally, the 
first litigated case in which the DOJ applied the hypothetical monopolist test was the 
bank merger case United States v. Virginia National Bankshares, Inc., 1982-2 Trade 
2008 FUTURE OF BANK MERGER ANTITRUST 587 
 
Guidelines, the hypothetical monopolist paradigm delineates the 
dimensions of the relevant market through an iterative process.31  
Products and areas are added one at a time until a hypothetical 
monopolist over a candidate market would find it in its interest to 
increase prices significantly.32  An increase of more than five percent is 
generally considered significant.  In this regard, price may serve as a 
metaphor for all terms of trade, and for small business loans it suffices to 
focus on the interest rate charged.  In determining whether the relevant 
market for small business loans is limited to a particular area, the 
hypothetical monopolist paradigm inquires into the extent to which 
small businesses served by the local banks would respond to higher 
interest rates by turning to outside lenders.  If a sufficient loan volume 
would shift, the hypothetical monopolist would not want to increase 
interest rates significantly and the relevant market, therefore, would be 
larger than the local area. 
Delineation of the relevant market under the Merger Guidelines 
does not account in any way for the range of products the merging firms 
actually sell.33  Neither does it take into account the ability of 
competitors to alter what they sell through supply substitution.34  The 
Merger Guidelines’ separate identification of the competitors in the 
relevant market accounts for supply substitution, however.35  A firm 
with no current sales in the relevant market nevertheless could be 
considered a competitor in that market by virtue of its ability to quickly 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982) (key issue being the geographic scope of the 
relevant market). 
 31. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 0. 
 32. See id. § 1.0. 
[A] market . . . [is] a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is 
produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price 
regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of those products in 
that area likely would impose at least a “small but significant and nontransitory” 
increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are held constant. 
Id.  The Merger Guidelines define a “relevant market [as] a group of products and a 
geographic area that is no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test.” Id. 
 33. See id. § 1.11 (describing the procedure for determining which products are in 
the relevant market). 
 34. See id. § 1.0 (“Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution 
factors—i.e., possible consumer responses.  Supply substitution factors—i.e., possible 
production responses—are considered elsewhere in the Guidelines in the identification 
of firms that participate in the relevant market and the analysis of entry.”); Werden, 
Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, supra note 2, at 529. 
 35. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 1.3. 
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and cheaply begin selling in the market using resources currently 
deployed elsewhere. 
When many products are readily substitutable in supply and have 
essentially identical competitive conditions, they are often aggregated 
together as what the Merger Guidelines term a “matter of 
convenience.”36  From the perspective of a small business, loans of 
different amounts may be poor substitutes, but a bank can freely 
substitute among loan amounts.  Consequently, a range of loan amounts 
could be aggregated together to form a category such as “small business 
loans.”37  The relevant market delineated under the Merger Guidelines 
could resemble the Supreme Court’s cluster of banking services only if 
success in providing individual banking services was dependent on 
providing all of the other services.  As this seems highly unlikely, it is 
also highly unlikely that the application of the market delineation 
analysis of the Merger Guidelines could yield anything like the full 
cluster of services provided by commercial banks. 
The Merger Guidelines also introduced the concept of a price 
discrimination market,38 in which a relevant market can be delineated 
not just on the basis of the characteristics of products or services, but 
also on the basis of the characteristics of the particular customers to 
which they are provided.39  The Merger Guidelines permit a separate 
market to be delineated for loans to small businesses if financial 
institutions can and do lend to them on different terms than to other 
borrowers.40  One way or another, application of the market delineation 
 36. See id. § 1.32 n.14; Werden, Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, supra note 2, at 
533–34. 
 37. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 6, at 36–37 (giving 
examples of what actually has been done); Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 29, at 
679. 
 38. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, §§ 1.12, 1.22. 
 39. See id. § 1.0. 
 40. See id. § 1.12. 
Existing buyers sometimes will differ significantly in their likelihood of switching to 
other products in response to a “small but significant and nontransitory” price 
increase.  If a hypothetical monopolist can identify and price differently to those 
buyers (“targeted buyers”) who would not defeat the targeted price increase by 
substituting to other products in response to a “small but significant and 
nontransitory” price increase for the relevant product, and if other buyers likely would 
not purchase the relevant product and resell to targeted buyers, then a hypothetical 
monopolist would profitably impose a discriminatory price increase on sales to 
targeted buyers. 
Id. 
2008 FUTURE OF BANK MERGER ANTITRUST 589 
 
methodology set out in the Merger Guidelines almost certainly leads to 
the conclusion that loans to small businesses constitute a relevant 
market.  Moreover, abandoning the cluster concept eliminates the need 
for the “workable compromise” of Philadelphia National Bank.  That 
decision correctly observed that the geographic area within which a 
customer obtains banking services depends on the customer and the 
service.41  In applying the approach of the Merger Guidelines, one can 
focus just on loans to small businesses. 
Return now to Phillipsburg National Bank’s notion that its 
“relationship with the local banker” is important for a small business.42  
Economic literature appearing long after that case was decided also 
focused on the relationship between a small business and its local 
bank.43  This literature posited that the creditworthiness of a small 
business is evaluated by a local bank on the basis of “soft” information 
often acquired through a banking relationship.44  Soft information is 
contrasted with hard information in financial statements.  The hypothesis 
put forward was that hard information on small businesses is either 
lacking or is less useful in evaluating creditworthiness than the soft 
information lenders acquire through meeting business persons face-to-
face, visiting their places of business, and providing them with other 
banking services such as checking.45  It was also hypothesized that soft 
information is accumulated gradually over time through long-term 
relationships.46
 41. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360–61 (1963). 
 42. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 364 
(1970). 
 43. See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Small Business Credit Availability 
and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organizational Structure, 112 
ECON. J. F32, F32, F38–F39 (2002) [hereinafter Berger & Udell, Bank Organizational 
Structure]; Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of 
Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68 J. BUS. 351, 351–52, 354–55 (1995) [hereinafter 
Berger & Udell, Small Firm Finance]; Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The 
Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 5–6 
(1994) [hereinafter Petersen & Rajan, Benefits of Lending]. 
 44. See Berger & Udell, Bank Organizational Structure, supra note 43, at F33–
F38; Peterson & Rajan, Benefits of Lending, supra note 43, at 5. 
 45. See Berger & Udell, Bank Organizational Structure, supra note 43, at F37; 
Petersen & Rajan, Benefits of Lending, supra note 43, at 6. 
 46. See Berger & Udell, Bank Organizational Structure, supra note 43, at F32, 
F34, F37; Petersen & Rajan, Benefits of Lending, supra note 43, at 5–6. 
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To the extent that soft information is important, it follows that 
distant lenders either cannot accurately evaluate a small business’s 
creditworthiness or can do so only at a much higher cost than a local 
bank.  Consequently, a small business either would be unable to borrow 
from a distant lender or would be able to do so only on unfavorable 
terms that reflect the added default risk arising from the lack of good 
information on creditworthiness.  Two studies empirically examined the 
importance of soft information as of the late 1980s with data derived 
from a survey of small businesses.47  Both found clear indications that 
soft information was important.  All else being equal, one study found 
that the interest rate for a line of credit was significantly lower when a 
borrower had a longer relationship with its lender.48  The other study 
found that a greater availability of credit was associated with a longer 
relationship.49  Both studies lent support for the notion that relevant 
markets were local. 
The foregoing economic literature supports only the proposition 
that relevant markets for small business loans were narrow in geographic 
scope back in the 1980s.  Patterns of small business lending have 
changed quite a bit since then, and small businesses have increasingly 
turned to distant lenders for some of their borrowing.  A 1993 survey of 
small businesses found that the median distance between a business and 
its bank was just four miles, but some long-distance lending brought the 
average distance up to 43 miles.50  The survey also inquired about the 
non-bank institutions with which the small businesses had financial 
relationships and found that the average distance between the small 
business and the non-bank financial institution with which it had a 
relationship was 251 miles.51  Analysis of the data from the survey 
indicated that the distance between the businesses and their financial 
institutions was significantly greater the more recently the relationship 
was entered into.  The average distance between the small business and 
its bank was 16 miles for relationships entered into in the 1970s, but 68 
miles for relationships entered into in the 1990s.52  Similar data from a 
 47. See Berger & Udell, Small Firm Finance, supra note 43; Petersen & Rajan, 
Benefits of Lending, supra note 43. 
 48. See Berger & Udell, Small Firm Finance, supra note 43, at 377–78. 
 49. See Petersen & Rajan, Benefits of Lending, supra note 43, at 34. 
 50. See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, Does Distance Still Matter? 
The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending, 57 J. FIN. 2533, 2537 (2002). 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
2008 FUTURE OF BANK MERGER ANTITRUST 591 
 
1998 survey indicated that the average distance between a small 
business and its lender more than doubled between 1993 and 1998.53  A 
study analyzing the 1993 data concluded that improvements in 
information technology reduced the disadvantages faced by more distant 
lenders.54
Many of the improvements in information technology were not 
specific to the financial sector.  They include the use of personal 
computers, spreadsheet programs, and the Internet.  However, one 
important innovation uniquely affecting the financial sector was the use 
of credit scoring—a systematic method for transforming available hard 
information into a single number predictive of the default risk associated 
with a loan.55  Credit scoring was first applied to individuals and then to 
small businesses.  Fair Isaac Corporation pioneered credit scoring in the 
1970s and introduced a small business credit scoring model in 1993.56
Credit scoring offered lenders an alternative, which many adopted, 
to reliance on soft information.  An analysis of data from a 1997 survey 
of large banks found that the adoption of credit scoring led to a 
significant increase in lending to small businesses, which was attributed 
to a reduction in information costs.57  Studies have also concluded that 
the use of credit scoring led to increased lending to distant small 
business borrowers.58  One study found that the bulk of the increase in 
distant small business lending between 1996 and 2001 was accounted 
 53. See Kenneth P. Brevoort & Timothy H. Hannan, Commercial Lending and 
Distance: Evidence from Community Reinvestment Act Data, 38 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 1991, 1993 (2006) (citing an unpublished memorandum written by employees 
of the Federal Reserve Board). 
 54. Petersen & Rajan, Benefits of Lending, supra note 43. 
 55. See Loretta J. Mester, What’s the Point of Credit Scoring?, BUS. REV., 3-4 
(Sept./Oct. 1997). 
 56. Fair Isaac Corporation provides a description of the latest small business 
model. Fair Issac Corp., http://www.fairisaac.com/NR/rdonlyres/30FB9F27-E88B-
4DB5-A19F-13A76241F82F/0/SBSS_6_PS.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). 
 57. See W. Scott Frame, Aruna Srinivasan & Lynn Woosley, The Effect of Credit 
Scoring on Small-Business Lending, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 813 (2001). 
 58. See Allen N. Berger, W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, Credit Scoring and 
the Availability, Price and Risk of Small Business Credit, 37 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 191 (2005); W. Scott Frame, Michael Padhi & Lynn Woosley, Credit Scoring 
and the Availability of Small Business Credit in Low- and Moderate-Income Areas, 39 
FIN. REV. 35 (2004). 
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for by banks that were significant issuers of credit cards and, 
consequently, experienced in the use of credit scoring.59
These developments and the resulting changes in small business 
borrowing patterns might suggest that the relevant markets for small 
business loans have expanded significantly in geographic scope and 
might even be national.  Although the available information does not 
eliminate all doubt, my perception is that developments in small 
business lending most likely have not broadened the geographic scope of 
the relevant markets. 
To understand why this is so, one must appreciate that what matters 
is not the loans local banks no longer make, but rather the loans they still 
do make.  Applying the hypothetical monopolist paradigm of the Merger 
Guidelines,60 one asks whether a hypothetical monopolist over a 
candidate banking market would find it profitable to significantly 
worsen the terms on which it provides its services.  For a hypothetical 
monopolist over small business loans in some local area, one would ask 
whether an increase in interest rates on such loans would cause a 
sufficiently large loan volume to shift to lenders outside the area to 
dissuade the hypothetical monopolist from imposing the increase.  The 
characteristics of the loans actually made in the candidate market clearly 
are what matter in determining the loan volume that would shift outside 
the local area.  The loans those banks do not make, for whatever reason, 
have no affect on the amount by which a hypothetical monopolist would 
want to raise interest rates. 
The economic evidence appears to paint a picture in which 
innovation has shifted relatively small loan volume away from local 
banks, leaving local banks with the loans for which they continue to 
have a significant advantage due to their proximity to the borrower.  
Data collected under the Community Reinvestment Act indicate that in 
2001, out-of-area banks accounted for just 12% of the small business 
lending volume in urban areas and just 17% in rural areas.61  The 
respective figures for the number of loans were 55% and 40%.62  This 
discrepancy is explained by the fact that out-of-area banks use credit 
scoring for what is sometimes termed “micro–business lending,” in 
 59. See Timothy H. Hannan, Changes in Non-Local Lending to Small Business, 24 
J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 31, 37, 45 (2003). 
 60. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 61. Hannan, supra note 59, at 37. 
 62. Id. 
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which the loan amount may be limited to as little as $100,000.63  Thus, 
distant banks appear to compete primarily for the smallest business 
loans. 
Recent studies also indicate that distant lenders using credit scoring 
suffer from a significant informational disadvantage.  One study 
examined loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration.64  
Among its findings were that, holding distance constant, the default rate 
was 23% higher for loans made by banks using credit scoring.65  In 
addition, the default rate was 22% higher on loans made to borrowers 
more that fifty miles from a bank than on loans made to borrowers less 
than twenty-five miles from the bank.66  A second study was based on 
reports which banks in nine selected metropolitan areas filed under the 
Community Reinvestment Act.67  It found that the average distance 
between the small business borrower and the relevant branch was only 
about three miles.68  It also found that greater distance made banks, 
especially small banks, significantly less inclined to lend.69  The study 
concluded that the loans banks still make to local small businesses are 
loans for which soft information is important and, hence, distant lenders 
are not significant competitors.70  A final study examined yields realized 
by commercial banks on business loans of all sizes between 1996 and 
2001.71  It found that smaller banks, which made smaller loans, had 
significantly higher risk-adjusted yields on their business loans, other 
things being equal.72  The study attributed the higher yield for smaller 
 63. See Robert DeYoung, William C. Hunter & Gregory F. Udell, The Past, 
Present, and Probable Future for Community Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 85, 96 
(2004). 
 64. Robert DeYoung, Dennis Glennon & Peter Nigro, Borrower-Lender Distance, 
Credit Scoring, and the Performance of Small Business Loans (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. 
Research, Working Paper No. 2006-04, Mar. 2006), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/analytical/cfr/2006/wp2006/CFRWP_2006_04_DeYoungGlennonNigro.pdf. 
 65. Id. at 32. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Brevoort & Hannan, supra note 53. 
 68. Id. at 2000. 
 69. Id. at 2006. 
 70. Id. at 2006–07. 
 71. David A. Carter, James E. McNulty & James A. Verbrugge, Do Small Banks 
Have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business 
Loans at Large and Small Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 233 (2004). 
 72. Id. at 249–50. 
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banks to the informational advantages associated with proximity and 
relationships.73
There may be a need to fine-tune the product dimensions of the 
relevant market to better focus on the characteristics of the loans local 
banks still make, but it seems most likely that banks still compete to 
make small business loans within narrow geographic radii.  Moreover, 
that will likely remain true well into the future.  This appears to be 
especially true in rural areas, where the Federal Reserve banks delineate 
the narrowest markets.74  Rural areas are of special interest because the 
banking industry is most highly concentrated in rural areas,75 so mergers 
are most likely to raise serious antitrust concerns in those areas.  
Moreover, rural areas tend to be served by small banks,76 and substantial 
empirical evidence indicates that small banks rely on soft information 
much more than larger banks.77  Finally, it appears small banks remain 
economically viable,78 so they can be expected to be around for many 
years to come.  Thus, my perception of the future is that bank mergers, 
especially in rural areas, most likely will continue to be properly 
analyzed within local relevant markets.
 73. Id. at 250. 
 74. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Tim Critchfield et al., The Future of Banking in America—Community 
Banks: Their Recent Past, Current Performance, and Future Prospects, 16 FDIC 
BANKING REV. 1, 10 (2004) (reporting that in 2003 the average deposit HHI in rural 
markets was 3671, while in three other categories of more populous areas it was less 
than 1600). 
 76. See id. (reporting that in 2003 community banks accounted for 53% of the 
deposits held by FDIC-insured institutions in rural areas). 
 77. See Allen N. Berger et al., Does Function Follow Form? Evidence from the 
Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks, 76 J. FIN. ECONS. 237 (2005); Rebel A. 
Cole, Lawrence G. Goldberg & Lawrence J. White, Cookie Cutter vs. Character: The 
Micro Structure of Small Business Lending by Large and Small Banks, 39 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 227 (2004); Jonathan A. Scott, Small Business and the Value 
of Community Financial Institutions, 25 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 207 (2004). 
 78. See DeYoung, Hunter & Udell, supra note 63. 
